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Introduction 
 
The modern idea that International Relations Theory (IR Theory) could be, and 
should be, distinguished from International Political Theory (IPT) would have 
been confusing to most of the founders of the discipline or field of International 
Relations and indeed to their pre-disciplinary forebears.  In so far as they 
recognised the terms at all, they would have assumed them to be synonymous or, 
perhaps, that the latter, IPT, was simply a sub-set of the former.  Most of the 
founders believed that theorising about international relations ought to be 
explanatory, normative and prescriptive and would have resisted the idea that 
one or more of varieties of theory should be privileged over the others, or 
isolated from them. Now, however, things have changed. Since the 1980s the 
term IR Theory has been mostly understood as designating explanatory theory, 
and, as a result, IPT has come to refer more specifically to normative and 
prescriptive theorising.  The purpose of this chapter is to explain how this state 
of affairs came to be, and to criticise the thinking that lies behind such a division 
of labour. If IPT is to develop its engagement with ‘real politics’ and to provide 
fruitful avenues for empirical research, an artificial divide between explanatory 
and normative theory cannot be allowed to persist – the goal must be to return 
to the more comprehensive account of theory espoused by the founders. 
 
Before ‘International Relations’ and the Early History of the Discipline 
 
Books entitled ‘International Relations’ or ‘International Politics’ begin to appear 
in the quarter century before 1914, along with a small number of university 
courses similarly titled, mostly in Political Science Departments and almost 
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exclusively in the United States (Schmidt, 1997) – but the emergence of 
International Relations as an academic discipline (or at least a separate field of 
study) is a product of the two World Wars. The First World War and the 
formation of the League of Nations stimulated systematic study of international 
relations, centred around a number of research institutes (e.g. the Council for 
Foreign Relations in New York, and the (later Royal) Institute for International 
Affairs, Chatham House, in London) and university Chairs; the Second World 
War, the United Nations and the Cold War produced a reboot of the field and 
substantial expansion. As a result, what we think of today as ‘International 
Relations’ is a product of the period from c. 1918 to c. 1955, but many of the 
ideas that it worked with had been first proposed in the three centuries before 
1914, before ‘International Relations’, by a mix of lawyers, philosophers and 
historians as well as political scientists. Most of the individuals concerned – a 
small sample of whose work will next be examined – did not think of themselves 
as International Relations theorists, but together they laid the basis for the later 
study and they did so without clearly demarcating separate roles for explanation, 
normative analysis and prescription. 
 
One obvious group of past thinkers who contributed to the new discipline is 
composed of theorists of Natural Law and the Law of Nations, thinkers who 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth century developed the notion that the 
emerging system of states in Europe constituted a norm-governed international 
society. Numerous individuals contributed to this notion, from Vitoria in the 
sixteenth century, via Grotius and Pufendorf in the seventeenth, to Emerich 
Vattel in the early eighteenth. The latter was in some respects the least 
intellectually interesting of this galaxy of stars, yet his text, The Law of Nations or 
Principles of International Law (1758) gives the fullest account of the principles 
of international society, and, crucially, is grounded not just in the principles of 
natural law, but also in the practices of international society (Brown, Nardin & 
Rengger, 2002). Accordingly, his account of the law of nations describes the 
condition of the European states-system, but it also explains how that condition 
is arrived at – through the operation of the balance of power – and, crucially, why 
the resultant international society is normatively desirable.  A stable balance of 
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power allows independent, legally equal but materially unequal, states to 
maintain their liberty, which is a key aim of statecraft. 
 
Maintaining independence in this way could, sometimes, involve war, and for 
that reason Vattel and his colleagues were described as ‘sorry comforters’ by 
Immanuel Kant, the philosopher who at the end of the eighteenth century 
produced the most elaborate and sophisticated account of the conditions of 
peace of his age.  Kant’s primary goal in Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch 
(1795) was prescriptive – his tract takes the form of a ‘peace project’, a popular 
literary genre of the eighteenth century – but his prescriptions are firmly based 
in an account of how the current order worked and what would be needed to 
change it (Kant, 1983). Although Kant did not describe his work in the terms of 
today’s social science, Michael Doyle was able to use his account of the 
preconditions for a perpetual peace to produce a highly influential version of 
‘democratic peace theory’, the notion that stable democracies do not fight each 
other (Doyle, 1983 a & b). Kant would have been surprised, and rather shocked, 
by the idea that his desired ‘republican’ states could be described as democratic, 
but would surely have approved of the idea that explanatory theory and 
normative theory are inevitably intertwined.  
 
Lawyers and philosophers approached international relations with a focus on 
norms and values, with explanatory theory a necessary but secondary feature of 
their work; proponents of raison d’état or Realpolitik reversed this order, 
beginning with power and its operation and then moving to normative 
prescription.  Machiavelli is the paradigm figure here, the inspiration for a clutch 
of Machiavellians (Meinecke, 1924/62).  His handbook for rulers, The Prince 
(1532) is for the most part a work about the nuts and bolts of power, how to 
achieve it, how to hang on to it, how to extend it (Machiavelli, 1988). But even in 
this short work the final chapter (‘Exhortation to Seize Italy and Free Her from 
the Barbarians’) is clearly prescriptive, and in his longer work The Discourses 
(1531) values and norms come to the fore – this is a passionate defence of 
republican principles (Machiavelli, 1996). This combination of the explanatory 
and the normative is common to later Machiavellians and ‘realists’, writers on 
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the balance of power such as Friedrich Von Gentz, or theorists of the rational 
state such as G.F.W Hegel (Brown, Nardin & Rengger, 2002).  
 
None of the writers discussed above would think of themselves as contributing 
to the discipline of International Relations – indeed, their writings precede the 
late nineteenth sub-division of social thought into separate academic discourses 
– but when, after 1918, such a discipline emerged it took over the aspiration, 
common to its predecessors, of creating theory that was normative as well as 
explanatory and that engaged with the real politics of its era. The ‘thinkers of the 
twenty years’ crisis’ were later accused by realist thinkers of neglecting the 
explanatory and the engagement with real politics in favour of utopian thinking, 
but an examination of their work refutes this characterisation (Long & Wilson, 
1995). Conversely, realist critics such as E.H. Carr and, a little later, Hans J. 
Morgenthau were accused of neglecting the role of values and norms and 
overemphasising pure power politics, but again the charge does not stick. A 
closer reading of Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) makes it clear that although 
he, rightly, criticised ‘utopians’ for substituting their hopes and fears for a 
rigorous analysis of the reality of the politics of the 1930s, it was not his 
intention to exclude utopian thought altogether from the study of world politics 
– rather, he believed that an International Relations that did not incorporate 
normative thinking would be sterile and impotent (Carr, 1939/2001; Booth, 
1991).  The most important British post-war realist, Martin Wight, took a similar 
position; he was very clear that in titling his pamphlet/book Power Politics he 
was not endorsing a crude Realpolitik but rather sketching the politics of the 
powers – although in his case the relationship between his own Christian 
pacifism and his normative prescriptions was not as clear as one might have 
hoped (Wight, 1946/95; Bull, 1976; Hall, 2006). 
 
Again, although Morgenthau believed that interest defined in terms of power 
was, or should be, at the centre of the study of International Relations, he was 
very much aware of the importance of the moral dimension of political life. Two 
of his famous ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’ concerned this dimension; the 
Fourth notes that political realism is aware of the moral significance of political 
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action, and accompanying tensions between ‘moral command and the 
requirements of successful political action’ while the Fifth insists that ‘Political 
realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the 
moral laws that govern the universe’ (Morgenthau, 1954). This latter point is of 
particular interest in the context of the relationship between American realists 
and US foreign policy over the last fifty years. In the 1960s Morgenthau was a 
leading critic of America’s war in Vietnam, while in the 2000s, figures such as 
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, using new social media, were very effective 
realist critics of neo-conservative thought on international relations 
(Morgenthau, 1970; http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pub-affairs.html ;  
http://foreignpolicy.com/author/stephen-m-walt/). 
 
To summarise the argument so far, the academic discipline of International 
Relations which finally came to a kind of maturity in the 1950s and 1960s was 
committed to what one might call a full-spectrum approach to theorising 
international relations. IR Theory was expected to be explanatory and 
prescriptive, causal and normative. The main theory of the post-1945 world was, 
in broad terms, realist, informed and shaped by figures such as Carr, Morgenthau 
and Wight – and, in France, Raymond Aron, in America, George Kennan and 
Reinhold Niebuhr – but this was a version of realism that was unafraid to 
address norms. And, in any event, there were other, non-realist, theories on 
offer, such as that associated with the idea of ‘world peace through world law’ 
movement promoted by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, along with other UN-
oriented ideas (Clark & Sohn, 1958).  It would be a mistake to over-state the 
pluralism of the discipline of International Relations in this period – for example, 
the contribution of classical political theory to an understanding of International 
Relations was seriously underplayed as the new discipline asserted the sui 
generis nature of its subject matter (Wight, 1960) – but at least the separation of 
International Political Theory from IR Theory, characteristic of a later period, 
was not a feature of the1950s and 1960s. So, what happened?  
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The ‘Scientific Study of IR’ and the Marginalisation of Normative Theory 
 
In the 1930s, Carr was clear that International Relations ought to be studied 
‘scientifically’; in the 1940s Morgenthau wrote of laws of politics, concerning, for 
example, the balance of power, in such a way that a casual observer might 
imagine that he too aspired to promoting the scientific study of international 
relations.  So, indeed, he did – but the model of science that he and Carr adhered 
to was very different from that of the ‘natural sciences’.  In Anglo-American 
usage the term ‘science’ immediately conjures up the disciplines of Physics, 
Chemistry and Biology, whereas in Morgenthau’s native German the nearest 
corresponding word is Wissenschaft which does not have such connotations – 
Wissenschaft essentially designates systematic and rigorous study. 
Geisteswissenschaft designates philosophy, history and the social sciences and 
there is no implication here that these subjects are to be studied in the same way 
that one might study Physics or Chemistry.  In one of his best books, Scientific 
Man vs. Power Politics Morgenthau explicitly confronts those who have the 
aspiration to study the social sciences in the same way that the natural sciences 
are studied (Morgenthau, 1947).  Such an aspiration was, however, a feature of 
what began as a minority movement within American Political Science in the 
1940s and 1950s and gradually came to achieve the status of an orthodoxy. 
 
In International Relations the move towards the scientific study of the subject 
was led by the comparatively large number of ex-natural scientists who were 
attracted to the field. These people were sometimes former physicists with a 
guilty conscience over nuclear weapons, or systems analysts employed by bodies 
such as the RAND Corporation to improve the quality of United States policy-
making in the area of defence. They were joined by imports from the behavioural 
sciences, who were attuned to a version of the social sciences that involved an 
attempt to study the actual behaviour of actors rather than the meanings they 
assigned to this behaviour. The aim of these ‘behaviouralists’ (as the movement 
came to be called) was to replace what they called the ‘wisdom literature’ and 
‘anecdotal’ use of history represented by Morgenthau and other traditional 
realists with rigorous, systematic, scientific concepts and reasoning. There were 
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various dimensions to this. It might involve casting old theories in new, rigorous 
forms - as with Morton Kaplan’s ‘balance of power’ models (Kaplan 1957). Or, it 
might involve generating new historical data-bases and time-series to replace 
the alleged anecdotalism of traditional diplomatic history - as in J. D. Singer and 
associates’ ‘Correlates of War’ Project at Ann Arbor, Michigan (Singer et al. 
1979), or the use of formal mathematical models for the study of decisions - as in 
game theoretic work and early rational choice theory in the hands of people such 
as Thomas Schelling at Harvard (Schelling 1960).  
 
For the purpose of this discussion, the key point about the movement to create 
what its proponents saw as a genuine science of international politics was the 
way in which normative and prescriptive work in the field was increasingly 
marginalised by the ‘scientists’.  Interestingly the aforementioned natural 
scientists were actually stimulated to enter the field by normative considerations 
and were resistant to this marginalisation; it was the behavioural scientists and, 
especially, economists who were more influential in putting normative work to 
one side. A key figure here was the American monetarist Milton Friedman whose 
1953 essay on ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ was enormously 
influential (Friedman, 1953/1966).  Friedman draws on the distinction between 
‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements probably best set out by the Enlightenment 
philosopher David Hume in the eighteenth century (Hume 1739/1985).  He 
distinguishes positive economics, which he believes tells us how things actually 
are, from normative economics, which purports to tell us how things should be.  
Thus, to take a famous example, the Phillips Curve was an exercise in positive 
economics which attempted to explain the relationship between the rate of 
inflation and the level of unemployment in a society – essentially lower 
unemployment was associated with higher inflation.   If the curve is accurately 
described it should be possible to predict the level of employment associated 
with any particular inflation rate – this is positive economics, but what it cannot 
tell us is which particular combination of the two variables is desirable; that, 
according to Friedman’s distinction, is a matter for normative economics. It is 
not something that can be decided by a fact-based calculation because whatever 
combination is chosen there will be winners and losers and deciding whether to 
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punish savers with high levels of inflation, or disadvantage job seekers with low 
levels, is a policy decision that reflects values not analysis. 
 
On the face of it, the distinction between positive and normative theory seems  
sensible, and has been adopted by some writers who describe themselves as 
normative theorists. Still, this adoption is, tactically, a mistake because although 
according to Friedman both positive and normative theory are, in principle, seen 
as legitimate activities, for most social scientists nowadays the former is 
regarded as more serious, in a sense more real, than the latter. Majority opinion 
has come to think that ‘real’ theory is explanatory theory – this is where the 
rigorous work is done, and normative theory is a decidedly second-rate activity. 
In any event, the distinction between the two is not as clear cut as Friedman 
would have it. Friedman’s account of a positive social science is clearly based on 
the model of the natural sciences, yet there are important ways in which the 
natural and social sciences differ.  In the natural sciences, non-reflexivity is the 
rule – to put it crudely, the subject matter of a natural science theory is not 
conscious of the fact that its behaviour or nature is being theorised, and is not 
capable of reflecting on the implications of this fact. Human beings are so 
capable; they can adapt consciously in ways that the objects of natural science 
cannot.  Neo-positivist theorists of international relations are, of course, 
conscious of this difficulty and do their best to adapt their theories to take it into 
account, and with some success – but it remains the case that the distinction 
between normative and positive theory is always blurred. Norms and values 
permeate human behaviour and they permeate the behaviour of states and while 
it is not necessary to go as far as those who argue that as a result all theory is 
normative it is clearly a mistake to think that there is a clear dividing line 
between the normative and the positive (Frost, 1996).   
 
Mistaken as this belief may be, the aspiration to create positive theory has been 
very influential in Political Science and in International Relations, especially in 
the United States which in quantitative terms (number of scholars, quantity of 
work produced) is the home of the discipline. As an aside, in the UK, where 
International Relations emerged not out of Political Science but out of Law, 
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Philosophy and History, there has been greater resistance to the siren call of 
positivist social science, but even here the trend is in that direction (Brown, 
2011).  The drive to push the American social science of International Relations 
in the direction of marginalising normative considerations was reinforced by the 
success of Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 book Theory of International Politics – 
somewhat ironically, because Waltz himself was by no means a positivist social 
scientist (Waltz, 1979; Booth, 2011).  Waltz’s book was instrumental in 
establishing the centrality of economic reasoning, i.e. rational choice theorising, 
neo-utilitarianism and analogies from neoclassical economics, for the study of 
International Relations. Although he described his work as ‘structural realism’, 
he is in fact offering a ‘rational choice’ version of the balance of power in which 
states are assumed to be self-interested egoists existing under anarchy and who 
can be treated as though they were determining their strategies by choosing that 
which maximizes their welfare. From this basic position can be derived a 
distinction between ‘defensive realists’ such as Stephen Van Evera who look 
simply for states to maintain their position within the system and ‘offensive 
realists’ such as John Mearsheimer who assume that states attempt to achieve as 
much power as possible, via at least regional hegemony (Van Evera, 1999; 
Mearsheimer, 2001). Equally important, some liberal thinkers accepted the two 
basic assumptions of international anarchy and the rational egoism of states; the 
aim of their analysis was to show that it was possible for rational egoists to 
cooperate even in an anarchical system, given a sufficiently high level of 
institutionalisation (Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985).   
 
Structural Realism and Liberal Institutionalism have been the dominant IR 
theories of the last thirty years, and each has achieved this position by 
abstracting from the broader notions of realism and liberalism, dominant in the 
inter-war and immediate post-1945 period, their normative and prescriptive 
dimensions.  IR Theory came to be understood as positive theory – explanatory 
in nature. Norms were acknowledged by some as contributing to the causal 
account of the world that was sought, ‘accounting for a small part of the variance’ 
as a causal theorist might put it, but normative analysis as such was given 
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secondary status. IR Theory’s loss, however, was to  provide a stimulus to 
International Political Theory. 
 
Bringing Political Theory Back In 
 
At the very point at which mainstream IR Theory was moving away from 
normative analysis, for the first time in the post-1945 world normative Political 
Theory was developing an interest in the international. The stimulus to this shift 
was the publication in 1970 of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice; Rawls’s work was, 
by common consent, a masterpiece, the most important work of Anglo-American 
political theory of the century, radical in its implications for social policy – but it 
was also, in one respect, very conservative (Rawls, 1970).  Rawls’s contract 
theory drew a sharp distinction between justice in domestic society and 
international justice; domestic societies were assumed to be self-contained co-
operative schemes for mutual advantage where principles of distributive justice 
were required – no such co-operative society existed internationally, so only the 
formal justice provided by international law was appropriate for relations 
between states. Social justice operated at the domestic level only.  From the 
outset this position was regarded as unacceptable – perverse even. The refusal to 
theorise international inequalities seemed wrong even, perhaps especially, to 
those who accepted the basic model of justice he proposed, and soon writers 
who were, as it were, more Rawlsian than Rawls himself were providing 
readings of international society that made space for principles of redistribution 
and social justice. The most important of these readings was Charles Beitz’s 
Political Theory and International Relations which appeared in 1979, co-
incidentally the same year as Waltz’s masterpiece (Beitz, 1979). 
 
There is no space here to go into all the ins and outs of post-Rawlsian theories of 
international justice, on which see Brown (2006 & 2015); the key point is that in 
the 1970s and 1980s political theorists began to focus on the international in a 
way that had not been seen since the time of Kant and Hegel.  Post-Rawlsians 
were only part of this story, albeit an important part. Alternative readings of 
international society were provided by Terry Nardin employing an Oakeshottian 
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framework, and Mervyn Frost whose ‘constitutive theory’ had Hegelian roots 
(Nardin, 1983; Frost 1986).  Perhaps of greater long run significance was the 
revival of Just War theory in the aftermath of the Vietnam war; here Michael 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is a landmark, the work that more than any other 
took just war thinking out of theological colleges and into the mainstream of 
political theory (Walzer, 2015). Walzer’s defence of political communities in that 
book, from a perspective that owed much to John Stuart Mill, stimulated an 
engagement with more cosmopolitan liberals such as Beitz and David Luban, 
usefully collected in Beitz’s edited collection International Ethics (Beitz, 1985).  
Here was the origin of the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate in IPT, on which 
see Chapter 2 of this Handbook.  Add to this the fact that in the 1970s human 
rights attracted more interest than they had for decades, partly as a result of 
their role in the East-West détente marked by the Helsinki Accords, partly 
because of the emergence of a non-communist discourse on economic rights 
(Moyn, 2010; Shue, 1980).   
 
In summary, a discourse of International Political Theory began to take shape in 
this period, not so much in opposition to mainstream IR theory, but in parallel to 
it. In many respects the post-Rawlsian wing of the new discourse were similar in 
their methodological assumptions to the rational choice theorists who were 
taking over mainstream IR theory – they accepted the distinction between 
normative and positive theory and were content to provide the former. But more 
significant was the fact that the new discourse provided a home for many writers 
who would previously have been happy to think of themselves as IR theorists but 
who now felt marginalised by structural realism and liberal institutionalism.  The 
most obvious group who fell into this category are the students of international 
society who in 1981 were characterised by one of their fiercest critics as the 
‘English School’, a label they soon accepted as a badge of honour (Jones, 1981).  
The leading figure of the English School of the time, the Australian Hedley Bull, 
had in 1977 produced an account of what he called The Anarchical Society that 
would have been recognisable by a figure such as Morgenthau as congruent with 
his own theoretical work – but Bull was also a fierce critic of what he regarded as 
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American scientism and had little time for the way the discipline was going in the 
United States (Bull, 1966; Bull, 2012).  
 
The relationship between English School writers and theorists of global justice 
was by no means always easy. Charles Beitz had directed some of his most 
trenchant criticisms of conventional IR theory in Political Theory and 
International Relations at English School writers, and, from the point of view of 
the Post-Rawlsians, John Rawls himself added insult to injury by restating his 
views on the distinctive nature of international society in a book that owed much 
to the English School – The Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999; Brown 2002).  Still, even 
though English School writers and post-Rawlsians disagreed about many 
matters of substance, they at least agreed that what they were disagreeing about 
was important.  Thus, for example, most English School were very sceptical 
about violations of the norm of non-intervention for humanitarian reasons or to 
promote regime change (and were joined in this scepticism by Michael Walzer) 
whereas most post-Rawlsians regarded this norm as of little importance, to be 
violated in the interests of universal values whenever it seemed prudent to do so 
– but both camps agreed that intervention posed important normative and moral 
questions, questions which mainstream IR theory had become incapable of 
posing let alone answering.  
 
A second category of theorists who now found International Political Theory to 
be more hospitable than IR theory, overlapping somewhat with the English 
School, is made up of historians of international thought. In the 1950s and 1960s 
there was comparatively little work being done on the history of international 
thought, and what there was was not of the highest quality - Martin Wight’s 
description of communists and Nazis as the children of Kant and Hegel is an 
extreme example of a dubious historical judgement from this period, extreme 
but not wholly uncharacteristic of the age (Wight, 1960).  By the 1980s, however, 
the quality of work on the history of international thought had risen quite 
dramatically – see for example Andrew Linklater’s Men and Citizens (Linklater, 
1982). Here Kant’s cosmopolitanism is liberated from the charge of utopianism, 
Hegel’s account of the rational state is no longer seen as a cover for German 
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nationalism, and Marx’s thought is studied in its own terms and not through 
Leninist lenses.  But such work was little valued by mainstream IR theorists; as 
IR theory took over from Economics its conception of formal theory, and from 
econometrics its quantitative techniques so it also took over the lack of interest 
in its own history that characterises the modern discipline of Economics. If, as 
Waltz would have it, the ‘anarchy problematic’ has the same characteristics in all 
non-hierarchical international orders, that is those where the units that compose 
the system are differentiated by capabilities not functions, then there is no 
advantage to the study of history save perhaps the collection of anecdotes for 
heuristic purposes.  The new discourse of International Political Theory at least 
provided a home for new high-quality historical work.   
 
Less easy to fit within the new discourse was the work of Critical Theorists, Post-
Modernists and Feminists (see e.g. Cox, 1981; Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989; 
Tickner, 1992).  It is difficult to generalise here, because these labels cover three 
very wide fields; some writers who self-identify as feminists or critical theorists 
are certainly engaged in International Political Theory, as other chapters of this 
Handbook testify – but the main emphasis of work in these fields lies elsewhere, 
and this is almost exclusively the case for Post-Modernist and Post-Structuralist 
work.  The reason for mentioning their work in this context is that these 
approaches have defined themselves in opposition to the IR mainstream in much 
the same way as International Political Theory has – they are, if not companion, 
at least cognate discourses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has traced the origins of the separation between IR Theory and 
International Political Theory, origins that still influence the shape of these 
discourses, even though some of the sharper edges of the distinction between 
them have been smoothed out. For example, the rise of constructivist IR Theory, 
albeit as still a minority discourse, has improved the status of normative thinking 
within the mainstream, while internal critiques of theories of global justice such 
as that of Thomas Nagel have challenged the readiness of some International 
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Political Theorists to disregard political realities (Nagel, 2005). As the contents 
of this Handbook illustrates, International Political theorists are now engaged 
with ‘real politics’ at a number of different levels, and via empirical research; as a 
result, and more or less inevitably, the distinction between normative and 
positive theory, always dubious in principle, becomes more difficult to sustain in 
practice. Perhaps the long term future involves a return to the situation in the 
early years of the discipline when IR Theory and International Political Theory 
were synonymous terms? 
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